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CONFRONTATION AS A HOT

Topic: THE VIRTUES OF

GOING BACK TO SQUARE ONE
By Richard D. Friedman
I have been working so obsessively on the accused's right to
confront the witnesses against him' that I am gratified that the
organizers of this conference have designated confrontation as one of
the "hot topics" of Evidence law. I am not so egotistical as to think that
my work has made confrontation into a hot topic; I am just glad to know
that I am working where a good deal of action is, and that other scholars
recognize that confrontation is an important area in which dramatic
changes may be occurring.
My particular interest is in the question of the extent to which the
confrontation right requires exclusion of statements made out of courtwhat might be called the hearsay aspect of confrontation.
The
prevailing doctrine virtually conforms this aspect of confrontation to the
ordinary law of hearsay. If an out-of-court statement is offered to prove
the truth of what it asserts, so that it falls within the basic definition of
hearsay, then there is a potential confrontation problem, but if the
statement falls within one of the many hearsay exemptions that may be
characterized as "firmly rooted," then the statement is almost certain to
satisfy scrutiny under the Confrontation Clause. Even if the statement
does not fall within such an exemption, there is a residual doctrine that
corresponds closely to the residual hearsay exception provided by
Federal Rule of Evidence 807: if the circumstances that surround the
making of the statement provide sufficient "particularized indicia of
1. See my articles, Confrontation Rights of Criminal Defendants, in J. F. NIJBOER
& J.M. REIJNTJES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST WORLD CONFERENCE ON NEW TRENDS IN
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION AND EVIDENCE 533-41 (1997); Confrontation: The Searchfor
Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011 (1998); Thoughts from Across the Water on
Hearsay and Confrontation, 1998 CRIM. L. REV. 687; Truth and Its Rivals in the Law of
Hearsay and Confrontation, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 545 (1998); Confrontation and the
Definition of Chutzpa, 31 ISRAEL L. REV. 506 (1997); Lilly v. Virginia: Glimmers of
Hope for the Confrontation Clause?, INT'L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE, July 10, 2000,
available at http://www.law.qub.ac.uk/ice/ (last visited Sept. 9, 2003); Remote
Testimony, 35 MICH. J. L. REF. 695 (2002); see also Richard Friedman & Bridget
McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1171 (2002).
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trustworthiness," then the confrontation problem is resolved.
This doctrine is an utter failure. Instead of articulating an
independent basis for the age-old and constitutionally-enshrined
confrontation right, it makes the right dependent on the vague and
unpredictable morass of hearsay law. Supposedly, according to the
Supreme Court, the right is based on the desire to produce reliable
evidence. But the paradigm of acceptable evidence, live testimony
subject to oath and cross-examination, may be completely unreliable;
indeed, when two witnesses give conflicting testimony, we know that at
least one of them is not reliable. Reliability is not an appropriate
standard for determining admissibility. The purpose of trials is to sort
out the reliable from the unreliable; evidence should not be barred at the
threshold because the court regards it as unreliable. On the other side of
the coin, one may wonder how often a statement is so reliable that
cross-examination would be of little value to the accused. Certainly, the
Supreme Court has been willing to regard as satisfying the reliability
standard some statements-such as dying declarations-that pose
obvious concerns that defense counsel would eagerly explore if given
the opportunity. Moreover, if admitting a statement would otherwise
violate the confrontation right, it is clearly inappropriate to admit it
nonetheless because the court decides that it is reliable. Suppose a
potential witness says to a friend,
I observed Defendant commit the crime, but I really don't want to go to court
to testify, take the oath and undergo cross-examination. I'm going to tell you
my testimony. You relay it in court, and if it's considered reliable it will be
admitted. I hope it will be. I had a good opportunity to observe, I have no
apparent reason to lie, and I'm talking to you soon after the event.

Even without developing a theory of what the confrontation right
means, it seems clear that a statement made under such circumstances
should not be admitted, even if a court concluded, as it well might, that
the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement endow it
with considerable reliability.
This hypothetical helps point the way to a better understanding of
the confrontation right. In my view, the essence of the right is that a
witness may not testify against the accused without being brought
before the accused. Medieval continental systems generally provided
for witnesses to give their testimony out of the presence of the parties,
but the English refused to accept such a system and instead insisted
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that-as had been the practice with the ancient Hebrews 2 and
Romans 3 -witnesses testify "face to face" with the accused. The
confrontation right, then, basically means this: If a person makes a
testimonial statement, that statement cannot be introduced against an
accused unless the accused has had an adequate opportunity to crossexamine the person, face to face4 and under oath. A person who makes
a testimonial statement is acting as a witness, and the basic idea of the
Confrontation Clause is that if a person acts as a witness against an
accused, then the accused has a right to confront her. There is obvious
ambiguity in the term testimonial statement, but it captures the idea
sufficiently well for present purposes to say that a statement is
testimonial if it was made with the reasonable anticipation that it was
creating evidence for use in a prosecution.
Two aspects of this approach are particularly noteworthy. First, its
scope is far narrower than that of the rule against hearsay. The hearsay
rule applies to any out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of
what it asserts. But the confrontation right, as I conceive it, applies only
to testimonial statements, the type of statement that makes a person a
witness. Thus, a statement made in the ordinary course of business,
including conspiratorial business, would not be a testimonial statement,
and so would not invoke the confrontation right. But a statement
describing a crime and knowingly made to authorities, or to an
intermediary designated to convey the statement to the authorities,
would be a testimonial one.
Second, the approach is very simple. It does not depend for its
viability on a long list of exceptions, as does the current approach.
Instead, it sets out a straightforward, bright-line rule: If a person's
testimonial statement is to be introduced against an accused, the accused
must have an opportunity to confront her. That rule is absolute, in the
same way that the rights to a jury and to counsel are absolute. We do
not deprive an accused of the right to have counsel in his defense or to
have his case decided by a jury simply because we regard the case
against him as overwhelming. Similarly, if a witness testifies in court,
we do not excuse her from cross-examination because her testimony
appears so reliable. And the same principle should apply when a person
acts as a witness by making a testimonial statement out of court; no
2. See Deuteronomy 19:15-19.
3. See Acts 25:16.
4. 1 will put aside here the question of the applicability of the face-to-face
requirement with respect to child witnesses.
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matter how reliable the statement appears to be, it should not be used
against the accused unless he has had an adequate opportunity to
examine the witness.
Indeed, the only appropriate qualifications to the accused's right to
confront the witnesses against him are those of waiver and forfeiture.
Like most rights, the confrontation right can be waived; if the
prosecution offers a testimonial statement that was taken without the
accused having an opportunity to confront the witness, but the accused
fails to object, ordinarily the right should be deemed waived. And if the
accused's own misconduct, such as killing or intimidating the witness,
accounts for the witness's failure to testify subject to cross-examination,
then the accused should be held to have forfeited the confrontation right
because he cannot complain about his inability to confront the witness if
he created that inability.
Part of the explanation for the simplicity of this approach is its
narrowness: Given that the scope of the right is not unduly broad, a
series of exceptions is not necessary to make the doctrine viable. And
another part of the explanation, to put matters bluntly, is that this
approach gets it right. If a legal system articulates well the motivating
principle behind a doctrine, then the doctrine can usually be stated in
relatively simple terms. If the system fails to articulate that principle,
then it can approach sensible results only by a series of relatively ad hoc
approximations.
The ready analogy is to the Ptolemeian and
Copernican systems. The movement of the planets could be described
accurately in the Ptolemeian system, which placed the earth at the center
of the solar system, but only at the expense of enormous complexity,
featuring mysterious cycles and epicycles. The Copernican system,
placing the sun at the center, provided a far simpler description of, and a
persuasive explanation for, the movement of the planets.
The change I propose has much the same tenor. It is consistent
with most, and probably even all, of the results of the confrontation
cases decided by the Supreme Court,5 though it obviously reaches those
results by a far different route than does the prevailing doctrine. Thus, I
do not agree with Professor Raeder's suggestion that reconceptualizing
confrontation law would require a wholesale disruption of caselaw.
5. This is a point made at length in the amicus brief of the American Civil
Liberties Union in Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 125-29 (1999). I was one of the
authors of that brief. I also make the point in an amicus brief filed on behalf of eight
other law professors and myself in Crawfordv. Washington, 54 P.3d 656 (Wash. 2002),
cert. granted,72 U.S.L.W. 3146 (U.S. Aug. 25, 2003) (No. 02-9410).
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Nor, for that matter, do I believe that a reconceptualization of the sort I
have advocated would constitute "starting over." It would, instead, be a
return to the original principle that underlay the establishment of the
confrontation right in the first place, the principle that ours is a system
in which prosecution witnesses must testify face-to-face with the
accused.
Finally, I do not agree that it is impractical to hope for a
reconceptualization of this sort. Three justices-Scalia, Thomas, and
Breyer-have explicitly indicated a willingness to rethink confrontation
doctrine, and along lines that share at least significant aspects of the
approach I have presented. And now the Court as a whole has given
significant new grounds for hope. The Court has granted certiorari in
Crawfordv. Washington,6 in which one of the Questions Presented is:
Whether this Court should reevaluate [the] Confrontation Clause framework
established in Ohio v. Roberts,7 and hold that the Clause unequivocally
prohibits the admission of out-of-court statements insofar as they are
contained in "testimonial" materials, such as tape-recorded custodial
statements.

Obviously, I believe the answer should be resoundingly in the
affirmative. The grant of certiorari gives reason to hope that the Court
will soon recognize that the current doctrine offers little explanatory
power because it fails to take into account what the confrontation right
is really about, that patchwork solutions of the type suggested by
Professor Raeder will not solve the problem, and that a clear and robust
sense of the confrontation right can be attained by insisting simply that a
testimonial statement cannot be offered against an accused unless he has
had an opportunity to confront the witness face-to-face.

6.
7.

72 U.S.L.W. 3146 (U.S. Aug. 25, 2003) (No. 02-9410).
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
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